This list of books are ONLY the books that have been ranked on the lists that are aggregated on this site. This is not a comprehensive list of all books by this author.

1. 1. Mind

   A Brief Introduction

   

   A clear, concise defense of a naturalistic account of the mind that treats conscious states as real, subjective, biologically grounded features of the brain rather than as immaterial souls or as mere computational processes; the work argues that intentionality (the aboutness of mental states) cannot be reduced to syntax alone, critiques both reductive materialism and strong artificial intelligence (most famously via a thought experiment showing that rule-following manipulation of symbols does not produce understanding), and shows how mental causation and first-person subjective phenomena can be coherently situated within a scientifically informed ontology without abandoning their irreducible, qualitative character.

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2. 2. The Rediscovery Of The Mind

   

   This book argues that consciousness and intentionality are real, causally efficacious biological phenomena that cannot be fully explained by computational or purely syntactic accounts of the mind. It defends a form of biological naturalism: mental states are caused by and realized in neurobiological processes, yet they have first-person qualitative features that resist reductive explanation. The author critiques strong AI, functionalism, and various reductionist and dualist positions, emphasizing that syntax alone cannot give rise to semantics and that philosophical accounts must respect the causal role of the brain while acknowledging the irreducibility of subjective experience. The work aims to reorient philosophy of mind toward an empirically informed account that preserves mental causation and explains how minds are both part of the natural world and distinct in their phenomenology.

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3. 3. Intentionality

   An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind

   

   An investigation into the nature of "aboutness" that defines mental phenomena, arguing that intentionality—the capacity of beliefs, desires, perceptions, and other mental states to be about or directed toward objects and states of affairs—is a fundamental, irreducible feature of minds. It distinguishes intrinsic intentionality, possessed by mental states, from the derived intentionality of linguistic signs and artifacts, critiques reductionist accounts (behaviorist, purely functionalist, and simplistic computational explanations) that try to eliminate or explain away intentionality, and develops an account that treats intentionality as a natural, biologically grounded phenomenon while accounting for its normative and semantic dimensions.

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4. 4. The Construction Of Social Reality

   An Essay in Social Ontology

   

   The book develops an account of social reality as constructed through collective intentionality and constitutive rules: certain physical or behavioral phenomena become institutional facts when people assign them status functions (the move often summarized as “X counts as Y in C”), creating rights, obligations, and deontic powers that underpin institutions like money, property, and marriage. It distinguishes institutional from brute facts, explains how language, declarations, and the background of shared capacities enable social objectivity, and argues that normative features of social life—oughts, rights, and duties—emerge from these collective practices rather than existing independently.

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5. 5. Minds, Brains And Science

   The 1984 Reith Lectures

   

   A sustained critique of computationalist and reductionist accounts of the mind, arguing that conscious, intentional states are biological phenomena caused by neurobiological processes and possess an irreducible first-person, qualitative character; through thought experiments and analytic argument (notably the argument that syntax alone cannot produce semantics) the author rejects strong AI, challenges identity theory and functionalism, and defends a form of biological naturalism that preserves the causal reality and explanatory distinctiveness of mental phenomena.