The Epistemic Innocence Of Irrational Beliefs by Lisa Bortolotti
The book argues that certain irrational beliefs—including delusions, confabulations, self-deceptions and other positively biased convictions—can nonetheless have important epistemic roles by helping agents make sense of experience, retain functioning cognitive systems, pursue inquiry, or avoid epistemic paralysis; it develops the notion of “epistemic innocence” to characterize beliefs that, while flawed by standard rational norms, deliver significant epistemic benefits and are not replaceable by less costly alternatives, reviews clinical and experimental cases to support the claim, and draws out implications for how we assess, treat, and understand the epistemic status of irrational mental states.
- Published
- 2014
- Nationality
- Unknown
- Length
- Unknown
- Pages
- Unknown
- Original Language
- English
- Avg User Rating
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(3.0)
- Alternate Titles
- None
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