Scientific Realism by Nicholas Rescher
The book mounts a careful defense of a qualified scientific realism, arguing that scientific theories aim at truth and that their empirical success and explanatory power provide reasonable warrant for belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world, while also acknowledging the fallibility and revisability of scientific knowledge. It examines classic anti-realist challenges—such as underdetermination, theory change, and the pessimistic meta-induction—and responds by emphasizing criteria like predictive success, coherence, and methodological constraints that together justify a pragmatic, epistemically modest realism grounded in the practice and progress of science.
- Published
- Unknown
- Nationality
- American
- Length
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- Pages
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- Original Language
- English
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